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Abstract
The Tardos scheme is a well-known traitor tracing scheme to
protect copyrighted content against collusion attacks. The orig-
inal scheme contained some suboptimal design choices, such as
the score function and the distribution function used for gener-
ating the biases. Sˇkoric´ et al. previously showed that a symbol-
symmetric score function leads to shorter codes, while Nuida
et al. obtained the optimal distribution functions for arbitrary
coalition sizes. Later, Nuida et al. showed that combining these
results leads to even shorter codes when the coalition size is
small. We extend their analysis to the case of large coalitions
and prove that these optimal distributions converge to the arc-
sine distribution, thus showing that the arcsine distribution is
asymptotically optimal in the symmetric Tardos scheme. We
also present a new, practical alternative to the discrete distri-
butions of Nuida et al. and give a comparison of the estimated
lengths of the fingerprinting codes for each of these distribu-
tions.
1 Introduction
To fight against copyright infringement, distributors of copy-
righted content embed hidden watermarks in the data, creating
a different version of the content for each user. Then, when
a user distributes his copy and the distributor finds it, the dis-
tributor extracts the watermark from this copy and traces it to
the guilty user. Assuming two versions can be created for ev-
ery segment of the content, it is clear that with a binary search,
`≈ log2 n watermarked content segments suffice to find one pi-
rate hidden among n users.
Things become more complicated when several users col-
lude, and compare their differently watermarked copies to cre-
ate a new version of the content that does not exactly match
any of their copies. Assuming that for each segment of the data
there are two different versions, and that in each segment the
colluders output one of their received versions (known in the
literature as the marking assumption), it is impossible to trace
c ≥ 2 colluders deterministically (i.e., with no probability of
error) with any fixed amount of segments. Fortunately, proba-
bilistic schemes do exist that allow us to trace up to c colluders
with at most ε probability of error, for any given c ≥ 2 and
ε > 0. One of the main objectives of research in this area is
to construct such traitor tracing schemes, that allow us to trace
colluders with as few segments ` as possible.
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1.1 Related work
In 2003, Tardos [13] showed that the optimal length of such
codes (i.e., the number of segments needed) is of the order `=
d`c2 ln(n/ε1) with d` = Ω(1), where ε1 is an upper bound on
the probability of catching one or more innocent users.1 In the
same paper, Tardos gave a construction of a scheme with d` =
100, which is widely known as the Tardos scheme. This shows
that d` = Θ(1) is optimal, and that the Tardos scheme has the
optimal order code length.
Over the last ten years, improvements to the Tardos scheme
have lead to a significant decrease in the code length parame-
ter d`. We previously showed [6] that combining the symbol-
symmetric score function of Sˇkoric´ et al. [11] with the improved
analysis of Blayer and Tassa [3] leads to an asymptotic code
length constant of d` = 12pi
2 ≈ 4.93 for large c. For small coali-
tions, Nuida et al. [9] showed that even smaller values d` can be
obtained by combining the symmetric score function with the
optimized, discrete distribution functions previously obtained
by Nuida et al. [10]. For large c, this lead to an asymptotic code
length constant of about d` ≈ 5.35.
Besides practical constructions of traitor tracing schemes,
some papers have also studied absolute lower bounds on the
asymptotic code lengths that any secure traitor tracing scheme
must satisfy. Huang and Moulin [4] and Amiri and Tardos [2]
showed that for large c, the code length constant of any scheme
must satisfy d` ≥ 2, but no practical constructions of schemes
achieving this lower bound are known. Huang and Moulin did
show that this lower bound is tight, and that in the related min-
max game between the traitors and the tracer, the optimal pirate
strategy is to use the interleaving attack, and the optimal trac-
ing strategy is to use a Tardos-like code with biases distributed
according to the arcsine distribution. Note that this does not say
anything about specific schemes such as the Tardos scheme, for
which the related min-max games are different and may lead to
a completely different optimal pirate strategy and tracing strat-
egy.
1.2 Contributions and outline
In this paper, we show that for large coalition sizes, the discrete
distributions of Nuida et al. [9,10] converge to the arcsine distri-
bution, thus proving that in the symmetric Tardos scheme, the
arcsine distribution is asymptotically optimal. Together with
results of Sˇkoric´ et al. [11] and us [6], this further implies that
the asymptotic code length `∼ 12pi2c2 ln(n/ε1) is optimal in the
symmetric Tardos scheme. On the practical side, we present an
alternative to the distributions of Nuida et al. with a simpler bias
1Note that ε2, commonly used for an upper bound on the probability of not
catching any pirates, does not appear in the leading term of the code length for
most practical values of ε1 and ε2.
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generation method, and conjecture that its performance is close
to the performance of the distributions of Nuida et al.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we de-
scribe the symmetric Tardos scheme, and different choices for
the distribution function F used in this scheme. In Section 3 we
state our results, and we devote Section 4 to proving the main
result. In Section 5 we present what we call discrete arcsine dis-
tributions, and in Section 6 we give a heuristic comparison of
the lengths of the codes in the symmetric Tardos scheme when
using these various distribution functions. Finally, in Section 7
we briefly discuss the results and mention a direction for future
research.
2 The symmetric Tardos scheme
Before we describe the Tardos scheme, we introduce some more
notation. The matrix X = (X j,i), consisting of bits, is used to
indicate which of the two versions of the ith content segment is
assigned to user j, for each user j∈{1, . . . ,n} and each segment
i∈ {1, . . . , `}. We write~y= (yi) for the pirate output, consisting
of ` bits.
The Tardos scheme roughly consists of two parts, which are
outlined below. The scheme depends on appropriately chosen
functions F and g, and constants ` and Z. The first part of the
scheme is performed before the content is distributed, and fo-
cuses on generating the code matrix X . The second part is per-
formed once the pirates have output a forged copy ~y and this
copy has been detected by the distributor, and focuses on find-
ing the guilty users.
(1) Codeword generation
- For each i, generate pi ∼ F .
- For each i, j, generate X j,i ∼ Bernoulli(pi).
(2) Accusation algorithm
- For each i, j, compute S j,i = g(X j,i,yi, pi).
- For each j, accuse user j if ∑`i=1 S j,i > Z.
This description is very general, and covers (almost) any
known version of the Tardos scheme. The choice of F and g,
and the method to determine ` and Z, are what separates one
scheme from another. In this paper we will focus on the class
of symmetric Tardos schemes, which means choosing g as the
symbol-symmetric score function of Sˇkoric´ et al. [11]:
g(X j,i,yi, pi) =

+
√
(1− pi)/pi, if X j,i = 1,yi = 1,
−√(1− pi)/pi, if X j,i = 1,yi = 0,
−√pi/(1− pi), if X j,i = 0,yi = 1,
+
√
pi/(1− pi), if X j,i = 0,yi = 0.
In this paper we will not go into detail about choosing ` and Z,
but focus on the distribution function F .
2.1 Continuous arcsine distributions
A common choice for the distribution function F is the arcsine
distribution with appropriate cutoffs. More precisely, we first
compute a cutoff parameter δc > 0, and we then use the distri-
bution function Fc defined on [δc,1−δc] by:
Fc(p) =
2arcsin
√
p−2arcsin√δc
pi−4arcsin√δc
. (δc ≤ p≤ 1−δc)
For c = 10, the distribution function F10 is shown in Figure 1.
For small values of c, the parameter δc has to be sufficiently
large for a certain proof of security to work. For large c, the
cutoff δc tends to 0, and the distributions converge to the well-
known arcsine distribution F∞, defined on [0,1] by:
F∞(p) =
2
pi
arcsin
√
p. (0≤ p≤ 1)
With these continuous arcsine distribution functions, we pre-
viously showed [6] that an asymptotic code length constant of
d` ∼ 12pi2 ≈ 4.93 is optimal. For details, see [6].
2.2 Discrete Gauss-Legendre distributions
Nuida et al. [9, 10] showed that if the pirates aim to mini-
mize their expected total score, the optimal distributions are
in fact discrete distributions, and are related to Gauss-Legendre
quadratures in numerical analysis. To define these distributions,
we first need to introduce Legendre polynomials. For c≥ 1, the
cth Legendre polynomial is given by
Pc(x) =
1
2cc!
(
d
dx
)c
(x2−1)c.
This polynomial has c simple roots on (−1,1), which we will
denote by x1,c < x2,c < .. . < xc,c. Now, the optimal distribution
functions, for arbitrary c, are as follows. Here, optimal means
that these distribution functions maximize the expected coali-
tion score.
Lemma 1. [10, Theorem 3] The optimal distribution to fight
against 2c−1 or 2c colluders, is
F2c−1(p) = F2c(p) =
1
Nc
c
∑
k=1
wk,cH(p− pk,c), (0≤ p≤ 1)
where Nc is a normalizing constant, H is the Heaviside step
function, and the points pk,c and weights wk,c are given by
pk,c =
xk,c+1
2
, wk,c =
2
(1− x2k,c)3/2P′c
(
xk,c
)2 .
The Gauss-Legendre distribution designed to resist 10 col-
luders is shown in Figure 1. For small c, this construction gives
much shorter codes than those obtained using the arcsine dis-
tributions with cutoffs. For large c, the code length parame-
ter goes up, and Nuida et al. [9] show that their results can be
extended to a construction that asymptotically achieves a code
length constant of the order d` ∼ K ≈ 5.35. For details on this
asymptotic result and Lemma 1, we refer the reader to [9, 10].
2.3 The asymptotic optimum
As we discussed above, the asymptotic code length constant
obtained by Nuida et al. [9] is slightly higher than the one ob-
tained by us [6]. This means that the asymptotic result of Nuida
et al. is not optimal. On the other hand, due to the Central Limit
Theorem, the scores of innocent users (per segment) converge
to the standard normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1,
while the total score of the coalition (per segment) converges to
a normal distribution with some unknown mean µ˜ and variance
σ˜2 < ∞, depending on the choice of F and the pirate strategy.
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Figure 1: The continuous arcsine distribution function with cutoff δ10 ≈ 0.003
(red) and the discrete Gauss-Legendre distribution function (green), both cor-
responding to the case c = 10. The dashed curve shows the arcsine distribution
function.
For fixed ε2 > 0 and large c, the only parameter that influences
the asymptotic code length is the mean µ˜ , which is minimized
by Nuida et al.’s choice of distribution functions. So we do
expect that the asymptotic lengths of the codes in the symmet-
ric Tardos scheme are minimized when using the distribution
functions of Nuida et al. The fact that their asymptotic con-
stant d` ≈ 5.35 is higher than the constant d` ≈ 4.93 which we
showed to be sufficient for large c [6], suggests that Nuida et
al.’s asymptotic analysis was not tight. Up until now, it was thus
an open question what the best asymptotic distribution func-
tions are in the symmetric Tardos scheme, as well as what their
accompanying code length constants are.
3 Main results
We will prove that letting c tend to infinity in the class of dis-
crete distributions of Nuida et al. leads exactly to the arcsine
distribution. This will be done by proving the following main
result.
Theorem 1. Let the parameters pk,c, wk,c, and Nc as in
Lemma 1. Let α > 0, and let k satisfy αc< k < (1−α)c. Then,
as c→ ∞,
pk,c = sin2
(
pik
2c
)
+o(1), (1)
wk,c =
pi
c
+o
(
1
c
)
, (2)
Nc = pi−o(1). (3)
Note that except for the points near 0 and 1, corresponding
to k = o(c) or k = c−o(c), the leading terms of the weights are
all equal. But since these points in the ‘middle’ carry 1− o(1)
weight (cf. the proof of (3)), the points near 0 and 1 have a
negligible total weight. On the other hand, the points pk,c con-
verge to the expected values of the corresponding order statis-
tics of the arcsine distribution, i.e., the value y corresponding
to F∞(y) = kc is exactly y = F
−1
∞ (
k
c ) = sin
2(pik2c ) = pk,c + o(1).
Since asymptotically all these points have the same weight,
after k of the c points we also have F2c(p
(c)
k ) =
k
c + o(
1
c ) or
F−12c (
k
c ) = pk,c + o(1). Since the set of points {pk,c}ck=1 is
dense in (0,1) when c tends to infinity, these results imply that
F2c(p)→ F∞(p) for each p ∈ (0,1), proving that the arcsine
distribution is asymptotically optimal in the symmetric Tardos
scheme.
Theorem 2. In the symmetric Tardos scheme, the arcsine dis-
tribution is asymptotically optimal.
Sˇkoric´ et al. [11, Section 6] previously showed that when
using the arcsine distribution, due to the Central Limit The-
orem the optimal code length inevitably converges to ` →
1
2pi
2c2 ln(n/ε1). So the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 1. In the symmetric Tardos scheme, the following
code length is asymptotically optimal:
`=
(
pi2
2
+o(1)
)
c2 ln(n/ε1).
In addition to these theoretical results, we present a new class
of distribution functions, which can be obtained by discarding
some of the order terms in Theorem 1. Compared to the Gauss-
Legendre distributions, these distributions are much simpler,
but still seem to achieve comparable code lengths. For details,
see Sections 5 and 6.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
(1): Let θk,c = arccos(xk,c). From [1, Eq. (22.16.6)] we have
θk,c =
(
4(c− k)+3
4c+2
)
pi+o(1) = pi− pik
c
+o(1). (4)
Using cos(pi−φ) = 2sin2( φ2 )−1 for φ ∈ R, we get
xk,c = cos
(
pi− pik
c
+o(1)
)
= 2sin2
(
pik
2c
)
−1+o(1).
Since pk,c = 12 (xk,c+1), Equation (1) follows.
(2): Combining [12, Eq. (15.3.1)] and [12, Eq. (15.3.10)], and
using 2sin( θk,c2 )cos(
θk,c
2 ) = sin(θk,c), we get
2
(1− x2k,c)P′c(xk,c)2
=
pi
c
sin(θk,c)+o
(
1
c
)
.
Dividing both sides by
√
1− x2k,c = sinθk,c leads to (2).
(3): The Gauss-Legendre quadrature rule [1, Eq. (25.4.29)]
states that for analytic functions f , there exist constants Ac > 0
and ξ ∈ (−1,1), with∫ 1
−1
f (x)dx =
c
∑
k=1
2 f (xk,c)
(1− x2k,c)P′c(xk,c)2
+Ac f (2c)(ξ ).
Let f (x) = (1− x2)−1/2. Then we have f (2c)(x) > 0 for all
x ∈ (−1,1), so in particular f (2c)(ξ )> 0. So it follows that
pi =
∫ 1
−1
dx√
1− x2 >
c
∑
k=1
wk,c = Nc. (5)
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On the other hand, from (2) and wk,c > 0 for all k, we have
Nc >
c−o(c)
∑
k=o(c)
wk,c = (c−o(c))
(
pi
c
+o
(
1
c
))
= pi−o(1).
So pi−o(1)< Nc < pi , which proves (3).
5 Discrete arcsine distributions
By making a slight refinement to (1) using (4), we get that for
large c and almost all values of k, the parameters of the optimal
distributions satisfy
pk,c ≈ sin2
(
4k−1
8c+4
pi
)
, wk,c ≈ pic , Nc ≈ pi.
To get the exact values of these parameters for large c requires
quite some effort, so in practice one may consider using an ap-
proximation of these distributions. An obvious approximation
to the above weights and points would be
p′k,c = sin
2
(
4k−1
8c+4
pi
)
, w′k,c =
pi
c
, N′c = pi.
Generating biases p from the associated distribution func-
tion is equivalent to drawing r uniformly at random from
{ 3pi8c+4 , 7pi8c+4 , . . . , pi2 − 3pi8c+4}, and setting p = sin2(r). Note that
if we were to draw r uniformly at random from the complete in-
terval [0, pi2 ], this would correspond to the arcsine distribution,
while drawing r uniformly at random from [arcsin(
√
δ ), pi2 −
arcsin(
√
δ )] corresponds to the arcsine distribution with cutoff
δ . So these distributions may be appropriately called discrete
arcsine distributions, and needless to say, for large c these dis-
tributions also converge to the arcsine distribution.
Remark. Interestingly, slightly different parameters,
p′′k,c = sin
2
(
4k−2
8c
pi
)
, w′′k,c =
pi
c
, N′′c = pi,
correspond exactly to the parameters of the so-called Cheby-
shev-Gauss quadratures [1, Eq. (25.4.38)]. These quadratures
allow one to approximate integrals of the form∫ 1
−1
g(x)√
1− x2 dx≈
c
∑
k=1
w′′k,cg(x
′′
k,c), (6)
where x′′k,c = 2p
′′
k,c−1.2 The distribution functions generated by
these weights and points are very similar to the discrete arcsine
distributions described above. The main difference seems to
be the “cutoff”, which would be about a third smaller (i.e., 2pi8c
compared to 3pi8c+4 ). Since these distributions are worse approx-
imations of the optimal Gauss-Legendre distributions, it seems
that the discrete arcsine distributions are a better alternative.
6 Estimating Codelengths
Let us now try to give a qualitative comparison of the sev-
eral classes of discrete and continuous distribution functions, in
2Also note the resemblance between Equations (6) and (5), when g(x) ≡ 1
is the constant function with value 1.
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Figure 2: Estimates of the code length parameters d` for several types of dis-
tribution functions F . The dashed line shows the asymptotic optimal value
d` = 12pi
2, corresponding to the arcsine distribution F∞.
terms of code lengths. Since the (tails of) distributions of user
scores are hard to estimate, and known proof methods are not
tight, we will only give a heuristic estimate of the code lengths.
Getting more accurate estimates remains an open problem.
Assuming that the scores of users are Gaussian, we can get
a reasonable estimate for the optimal code length parameter as
d` ≈ 2/µ˜2, where µ˜ is the expected average pirate score per
content segment [11, Corollary 2]. In the case of the discrete
distributions of Nuida et al., µ˜ does not depend on the pirate
strategy, so we can compute µ˜ exactly. For the arcsine distribu-
tions with cutoffs and the discrete arcsine distributions, µ˜ does
depend on the pirate strategy, but by considering the attack that
minimizes µ˜ we can obtain lower bounds on µ˜ .
Figure 2 shows the resulting estimates of d`, as well as the
provable upper bounds on d` of [6] (for constant ε2). Note that
the heuristic estimates for the continuous distributions are based
on the arcsine distributions with cutoffs optimized for the proof
technique of [6]. A different optimization of the cutoffs would
lead to different (smaller) values of d`.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that the optimal discrete distributions of Nuida
et al. converge to the arcsine distribution, hence showing that
the arcsine distribution is asymptotically optimal in the sym-
metric Tardos scheme. This connects the world of the discrete
distributions to the world of the continuous distributions, as
both converge to the same distribution.
In practice, the question remains which distribution function
to choose. In the static Tardos scheme, choosing one of the
discrete distributions seems logical, as this may drastically re-
duce the length of the fingerprinting code. On the other hand,
when c is unknown, using the continuous distribution functions
with cutoffs may also have its benefits, since if the coalition is
slightly larger than expected, the scheme still has a good chance
of catching the pirates. Recently, it was shown that the Tar-
dos scheme can also be extended to the dynamic traitor tracing
setting, allowing efficient tracing of pirates when the colluders
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broadcast their forged copy in real-time [7,8]. The construction
of the universal Tardos scheme in [7] uses the fact that the con-
tinuous distributions are very similar for different values of c, so
in this setting it seems that the continuous arcsine distributions
are also more practical.
An interesting open problem is what happens when the num-
ber of versions per content segment increases from 2 to q. Re-
cent results show [5] that with unlimited computing power, the
optimal asymptotic code length decreases linearly in q. This
suggests that the optimal length of q-ary Tardos codes possibly
decreases linearly in q as well. Sˇkoric´ et al. [11] analyzed a
natural generalization of the Tardos scheme to the q-ary setting,
but did not obtain this linear decrease in q in their code lengths.
The question remains whether their construction is suboptimal
(and if so, whether this has to do with the choice of F or the
choice of g), or if approaching the fingerprinting capacity for
higher q with a single decoder traitor tracing scheme is simply
impossible.
8 Acknowledgments
We thank Jeroen Doumen, Wil Kortsmit, Jan-Jaap Oosterwijk,
Georg Prokert, Berry Schoenmakers, and Boris Sˇkoric´ for valu-
able discussions. We would also like to thank the anonymous
reviewers for their useful comments.
References
[1] M. Abramowitz and I.A. Stegun, editors. Handbook of
Mathematical Formulas. Dover Publications, 1972.
[2] E. Amiri and G. Tardos. High rate fingerprinting codes
and the fingerprinting capacity. In Proc. 20th Symp. on
Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pages 336–345, 2009.
[3] O. Blayer and T. Tassa. Improved versions of Tardos’ fin-
gerprinting scheme. Designs, Codes and Cryptography,
48(1):79–103, 2008.
[4] Y.-W. Huang and P. Moulin. On the saddle-point solu-
tion and the large-coalition asymptotics of fingerprinting
games. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security, 7(1):160–175, 2012.
[5] Y.-W. Huang and P. Moulin. On fingerprinting capac-
ity games for arbitrary alphabets and their asymptotics.
In Proc. International Symposium on Information Theory
(ISIT), pages 2571–2575, 2012.
[6] T. Laarhoven and B. de Weger. Optimal symmetric Tardos
traitor tracing schemes. Designs, Codes and Cryptogra-
phy, 2012.
[7] T. Laarhoven, J. Doumen, P. Roelse, B. Sˇkoric´, and
B. de Weger. Dynamic Tardos traitor tracing schemes.
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 2013.
[8] T. Laarhoven, J.-J. Oosterwijk, and J. Doumen. Dynamic
traitor tracing for arbitrary alphabets: Divide and conquer.
In Proc. 4th Workshop on Information Forensics and Se-
curity (WIFS), pages 240–245, 2012.
[9] K. Nuida, S. Fujitsu, M. Hagiwara, T. Kitagawa,
H. Watanabe, K. Ogawa, and H. Imai. An improvement of
discrete Tardos fingerprinting codes. Designs, Codes and
Cryptography, 52(3):339–362, 2009.
[10] K. Nuida, M. Hagiwara, H. Watanabe, and H. Imai. Op-
timization of Tardos’s fingerprinting codes in a viewpoint
of memory amount. In Proc. 9th Conf. Information Hiding
(IH), pages 279–293, 2007.
[11] B. Sˇkoric´, S. Katzenbeisser, and M.U. Celik. Symmetric
Tardos fingerprinting codes for arbitrary alphabet sizes.
Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 46(2):137–166, 2008.
[12] G. Szego˝. Orthogonal polynomials. American Mathemat-
ical Society, 4th Edition, 1975.
[13] G. Tardos. Optimal probabilistic fingerprint codes. In
Proc. 35th Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC),
pages 116–125, 2003.
5
